In which I talk about photons and polarisation - an article I've long had in 'draft' form.

# Chip and Pin is Broken

# Quantum Cryptography (a background)

In this article I hope to illustrate some of the ideas behind the strange topic of Quantum Cryptography, though I won't be discussing cryptography itself, that comes later - just the necessary physics. First we must consider the nature of light (this can be generalised to any particle once we get all quantum mechanical, but let's stick with light for now).

Classically, light can be thought of as a wave. It's a *transverse* wave meaning that the 'oscillations' of the thing doing the waving are at right angles to the direction that the wave is travelling in. Another example of transverse waves are waves on the surface of water.

These oscillations defined a 'plane' in which the waves are oscillating, and this plane can be oriented at any angle. Waves on the surface of water are vertically polarised. Though the plane of polarisation can be any angle, it is convenient to pick two planes which are at 90 degrees to each other. We can express any polarisation by talking about how much of each is present. Hence, we can talk of 'vertical' and 'horizontal' polarization. Here is an applet which demonstrates this.

You can see polaroid filters in action if you have a pair of polaroid glasses (often sold as 'anti-glare'). Find a light shining on a surface such as a desk. You don't want to be 'square on' to the surface, the light should be bouncing at an angle, 45 degrees is a good start. For the most obvious effect, don't use a mirror.

Look at the surface through your polaroid glasses, then rotate them 90 degrees, and keep looking. You should see the glare change in brightness. You will find that polaroid glasses are best at reducing glare from horizontal reflections when held normally. (See: Brewsters' Angle)

If you use your glasses for driving, you may find that you have trouble with the LCD screens on petrol pumps, this is because the LCD screen relies on polarising light!

If you take a polarised filter, this will ensure that all the light which passes through has the same polarisation. Classically, if a particular wave comes in with an amplitude of A, and a plane of polarisation at angle θ to the plane of polarisation, the amount of light which emerges has amplitude Acosθ.

Suppose that we have two polaroid filters. Unpolarised light hits the first and emerges polarised. It emerges with amplitude, A (on average). This light hits the second filter. The two filters have an angle θ between their planes of polarisation - the amount of light which emerges is Acosθ. So, if the filters are aligned, the second filter has no effect. If it is turned 90 degrees, no light emerges (note, if it is turned 180 degrees, it has no effect - the sign of the amplitude doesn't matter, it's not 'negative light'!)

(Note that for real filters, there is a little scattering, so 90 degrees doesn't give total black, and zero degrees does give some reduction in intensity)

Imagine we have two filters, aligned at 90 degrees. No light emerges. This is because the cosine of 90 degrees is zero.

Now, insert a filter at 45 degrees between the two. What happens? More 'stuff' can only make the amount of light getting through smaller, right? The cunning reader will have assumed that I wouldn't ask the question if the answer were obvious. Some light emerges. In this circumstance, two filters allows through less light than three.

This counterintuitive result is easily explained. Imagine the second filter is at an angle of θ compared to the first. The third is at 90 degrees. In other words, the angle from the second is (90-θ). From the first filter, we have light with amplitude Acosθ. This is then reduced by the third filter by cos(90-θ). The overall light intensity is now Acosθ.cos(90-θ) or Asinθcosθ, this reduces to A(sin2θ)/2. In other words, we get most light out when sin2θ=1, or when 2θ=90°, or when θ=45°

The newly inserted second filter is changing the polarisation of the light.

Take your time on polarisation, it's important that you understand the above if you're to comprehend subsequent articles. We'll put this aside for a while, though - the next step is to talk about photons.

# GeoHashing

Via xkcd I learned of a new idea called 'Geohashing'

Essentially the idea is that based on some seed data, some complicated sums are done to give a location.

People get to that location for a meetup.

A map tool is available which does the sums for you. You set the date, click your area and it gives you a location.

Due to problems with the seed data (US stock market) and time zones a new rule has been introduced today for people east of 30 degrees west. This is taken care of automatically by the map tool. There are several pieces of code for implementing this - though most have yet to be updated to reflect the 30W rule.

The idea is that the seed data is processed using an algorithm called md5. This algorithm produces a 'hash' of the data. it is difficult to find alternate data which produces the same hash. A small change in the data produces a big change in the hash.

The idea of a hash is a way of producing a 'fingerprint' of a file. I.e. I could send you a file, but how would you know it hadn't been tampered with? Well, I could phone you, you could recognise me and I could read you the hash of that file (which you can then generate and check).

A hash can also be used as a zero knowledge proof. I.e. I wanted to prove to you that I had discovered some fact. I might not want you to know the fact (yet). For example, I might know the first line of the 'Times' editorial for next saturday. I could generate a hash of that line and give it to you - when the paper is published that information can be checked.

In this case, the md5 algorithm is used to give a reasonable pseudo-randomisation of one number into another. It's just a bit of fun.

I've not gone to a geohash event myself - but I like the concept.

# SHA-1 Broken

SHA-1 which is key to many cryptographic protocols, e.g. PGP, SSH, and the cryptography behind shopping online has been broken. It isn't currently a major issue as large resources are needed, however, work will need to be done to replace the affected algorithms before improvements in technology and in the algorithms make the attack more feasible.

Additional: Bruce Schneier has just written on this issue.

# PGP

Previously I have mentioned RSA and Public Key systems as well as briefly mentioning PGP.

The most well known public key system is probably PGP. PGP was created 'for the masses' by Phil Zimmerman.

Good public key systems are vital in todays world to secure everything from online commerce to credit card transactions. You would not be able to have a secure connection to amazon.co.uk or amazon.com without a public key system!

PGP is available in the US from pgp.com. People outside the US should download PGPi. This is essentially the same software, but was originally exported legally by printing the source code, walking it out and then typing it in again (the law is an ass!)

As well as RSA, PGP uses the IDEA algorithm, which is under patent. This gave rise to GPG (GNU Privacy Guard)

When you install PGP or GnuPG you generate a pair of keys, one public, one private. The public key can be freely published. This is mine.

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# Venona

'Venona' was the code name for US decrypts made on Soviet traffic, some of which were encoded using a One Time Pad. The codename in the UK was 'Bride' If used correctly, a One Time Pad is unbreakable. The Soviets knew this, and used One Time Pads for much of their encryptions, for trade and diplomatic messages as well as covert traffic.

So, how was it possible for the messages to be broken?

The Soviets had a difficulty, and that was key distribution. They needed to generate and distribute a large amount of random data. This data had to be kept secure as it was distributed to their embassies and agents. This was a monumental task.

They cheated.

They reused some keys on different 'channels' of communication, hoping that nobody would notice. Meredith Gardner was able to combine ciphertexts and remove the effect of the randomising key, in much the same way that the German Lorenz machine was first analysed. This allows the cryptanalysts to guess at letters on one message which used a particular key and try to find guesses which 'made sense' in the other message.

Not all of the traffic was encoded with One Time Pads, though. Over time. Using a variety of methods ranging from defections to buggings and burglaries, more Soviet traffic was decrypted.

The programme ceased in 1980, having started in the 40s. In the 1990s, Venona decrypts were released to the public in several batches and are available for download.

Note that there are, at this time, HTML errors in some links on the Venona webpages. Some links refer to things like: http://localhost/venona/venon00026.cfm

To fix this, just copy the link, paste it into the address bar, and replace 'localhost' with www.nsa.gov, so the above becomes: http://www.nsa.gov/venona/venon00026.cfm

# Using Spruchnummer to crack Lorenz

Before reading further, you may like to read earlier articles on XOR and the Spruchnummer error. In sending the Lorenz cipher, one German operator used the same settings to send two identical messages, or rather, near identical messages. One began 'Spruchnummer' and the other began 'Spruchnr' and continued on.

The allies realised that these two messages used the same key and so they could 'remove the randomness' of the key by XORing the messages together.

When they XORed, they had two plaintexts XORed, the result was gibberish.

Tiltman, then used a 'known plaintext' attack. He guessed some plausible beginnings to the messages, and from experience with Enigma traffic soon guessed that one of the messages would begin 'Spruchnummer' (message number).

He knew his guess was likely to be correct, as XORing 'Spruchnummer' with the start of the message combination, produced a reasonable looking fragment of the second message:

The second message was 'Spruchnrabcd' (where abcd represents the continuation of the second message)

Tiltman then assumed that one message was an abbreviation of the other, so he now guessed the first message was Spruchnummerabcd, this allowed a few more letters of the second message to be found.

He continued in this way through the messages until he was able to decode both messages (the end of the longer message was found as it was an unabbreviated version of the second!) A few times he stalled due to a typing mistake on the part of the German operator, but he could always find a way past the block by trial and error, knowing that the two messages were fundamentally similar.

Now Tiltman had plaintexts and ciphertexts, so he was able to extract the string of key bits which was used. He looked at the behaviour of each of the bits in the key (i.e. the first bit in each character, the second bit and so on), and was able to extract periodically repeating information. This allowed him to deduce the internal structure of the machine. The machine settings would change with each message, but now he knew how the machine did what it did.

This was all a real *Tour de force*.

# More fun with XOR

In order to discuss how the 'Spruchnummer' mistake lead the the Lorenz being broken, and why we must never reuse a one time pad key, we must first understand a little more about the nature of the XOR operation. XOR is essentially a 'bitwise' operation, i.e. it operates on signal bits at a time. I've already discussed some of these ideas in the 'One Time Pad' article, this article presents things in a slightly different way, and takes things a little further.

Suppose we had two bits, A and B which are XORed. The bits can only have one of two values, 0 or 1. XOR simply says 'If the bits are the same, the result is zero, if different the result is 1'. Throughout this entry I'll use ⊕ as the symbol for 'XOR'.

Thus, XOR is also 'commutative' (the order it's done in doesn't matter) as 0⊕1 gives the same result as 1⊕0.

Also, if we XOR anything with 0, the result is the same as whatever we put in (1⊕0=1 and 0⊕0=0).

Now, imagine that we have a set of plaintext bits, P, that we wish to combine with a set of key bits, K.

The result is ciphertext, C, where C=P⊕K.

To get to P, we just do C⊕K, i.e. XOR undoes itself. You should see that K⊕K=0, this is because each bit is being XORed with an identical copy of itself.

To see this, we'll start by saying that C = P⊕K, as above. Suppose we do the operation C⊕K, this is like doing (P⊕K)⊕K. As the order we do things doesn't matter, this is the same as P⊕(K⊕K). As K⊕K = 0, we find that this is P⊕0, which is P!

If you don't believe me, work it through for yourself with some of the previous examples that I used in earlier articles.

Now, suppose that we had two messages, P1 and P2, which are both XORed with the same key, K.

These produce C1 and C2, where C1=P1⊕K and C2=P2⊕K.

We, as cryptanalysts could compute A new message, C1⊕C2. This effectively removes the random key.

This is because C1⊕C2 is equal to (P1⊕K)⊕(P2⊕K).

Rearranging shows this is P1⊕P2⊕K⊕K, and as K⊕K is 0, we get P1⊕P2⊕0, which is just the same as P1⊕P2.

What we are left with is still unintelligable, but we know know that it is one real message XORed with another real message - we have sucked out the randomness, because the *same randomness* was used twice.

In the second world war, Tiltman used this 'removal of randomness' as a first step in cracking Lorenz.

# A Mistake with Lorenz

# Quantum Cryptography

There have been several news items this morning about Quantum Cryptography - I plan articles on this in the future. Japancorp reports that a quantum cryptography system has sent a key over 40km of fibre optics. This is a new record.

Converge Digest confirm this story, as do Asia One in a readable article.

# Lorenz Cipher

# Lorenz Cipher

# RSA

# Protocols for Public Key Systems

An issue arises with standard cryptography regarding key exchange. Imagine: Two people who cannot meet wish to encrypt a communication. With 'symmetrical' cryptography this cannot be done as they must first agree a key with which they can encrypt their data.

They must agree a key securely, i.e. without eavesdroppers, if their message is to be secure. If they can do this then surely they don't need to use cryptography in the first place!

There are two solutions to this which I am aware of, one is quantum cryptography and the other is public key cryptography. Here we'll discuss the latter.

A public key system addresses this issue by using **two** keys.

These keys are the **public** and the
**private** key. The public key is published
widely.

The public key can be used by anyone to "lock up" the message,
but it will not decode the message - only the private key will
do that, and of course, the private key is kept just
that - private. (Unless one is using *Key escrow*!)

There are many ways to produce such a key pair, sufficed to say that the detailed method is not important when discussing how the keys are used. Functions which could be used in this way are called 'trapdoor' functions, as they are easy to use in one direction (e.g. from the private key to calculate the public key) but hard to use in the other.

Let's talk about Alice, Bob and Carol, the cryptographer's stooges. Alice and Bob wish to establish secure communications without having met each other, but Carol is trying to listen in. Can they talk securely?

In a single key system Alice and Bob first have to agree on a key. Carol will simply record the key it is exchanged, and thereafter be able to decode all messages with ease. Clearly this will not be sufficient if the correspondants cannot meet.

Can a public key system solve this dilemma? In the present
form the answer is **NO**. This is not immediately
transparent and so I will work through it with you.

Alice and Bob both generate a key pair, **public** and **private** key.
The private key is not revealed, but the public key (shown) is made available for distribution.

Remember, at no point do either disclose their private key.

Alice and Bob then exchange **public** keys. . .

. . . and of course, Carol takes a copy of each key.

Surely this is secure? These are public keys remember - they can only be used to encipher information - they cannot be used to decipher the information - only the private key can do that.

Carol cannot read the traffic . . . but have we missed something?

Predictably, Yes we have.

What if Carol is in a position where she can intercept and replace the communication, i.e. what if Carol is, for example, an internet service provider - where all email goes en route through her machine? Then we have a problem.

**Carol can replace the keys.**

If Carol is in a position where the email goes through her
machine then when Alice sends her public key to Bob, Carol
could *substitute her own key* which * claims
to belong to Alice*. Similarly, when Bob sends
his key to Alice then Carol simply substitutes a fake "Bob key".

The situation now is that Alice has her real key pair, and a
key which she believes belongs to Bob. Bob has his key pair,
and a fake Alice key. Carol has the real public keys for Alice
and Bob, the fake public keys for Alice and Bob, *and also
the private keys which correspond to the fake keys*.

What happens now when Alice sends a message to Bob?

Well, Alice composes and codes her message as usual. Except
now she code it *with the faked key* which Carol slipped to her. Alice then sends
the message. Carol can set up software to automatically
intercept the email from Alice, and decrypt it - remember
she possesses a private key which corresponds to the fake
public key of Bob's.

Having read the message, Carol can the re-encipher the
message using Bob's **real** public key and
forward the message to Bob as usual. Thus Alice and Bob
*think* they're having a secure conversation, yet
in reality Carol is listening in - *and she doesn't
have the real private keys for either
Bob or Alice!*

#### Plugging the Loophole

As we have seen, the main weakness in a public key system is this:

*How do I know that this key really belongs to my correspondant?*

Protocols have been derived to answer this question. Let's examine several examples.

The most trivial case is the one where the correspondants have had an opportunity to meet, and they've handed over a copy of their keys on floppy disk. They can each be sure that the keys belong to the other person. Obviously, if it is possible to do this then it is surely a good method of knowing that a key may be trusted, however, it is not always practical - otherwise why use Public Key?

This may strike you as being rather cumbersome. It is. This is why key fingerprints were devised. The fingerprint is analagous to a human fingerprint - it's extremely unlikely that two keys will share the same fingerprint.

If Alice and Bob meet then they can exchange key fingerprints, these may be handily printed onto a slip of paper or business card and carried on the person. When Alice and Bob get back home they can simply compare the fingerprint on the piece of paper with the fingerprint of the key under suspicion. Carol's fake keys will bear a different fingerprint, and hence will not be used by Alice or Bob. The fake keys are revealed for what they are.

Of course, if Alice and Bob know each other well enough to talk to over the telephone, then the fingerprint may be read out over the phone.

What if Alice and Bob have never met, and are never likely to meet? This is where **key
signatures** come in.

If you have personally verified that a given key belongs to a
given person, then it is common practice to sign that key. The
signature is made with your **private** key - so
only you can make the signature - your signature may be verified
by anybody, comparing the signature with your public key.

Now suppose Alice and Bob have a mutual friend, David. David has signed both Alice's key and Bob's key, and both Alice and Bob have a verified copy of David's key.

When Bob examines Alice's key he observes that her key was signed by David, Bob trusts that David is reliable when it comes to signing other people's keys. Therefore Bob can be fairly certain that the key belongs to Alice.

The thing with PGP in particular is that YOU decide who is trustworthy when it comes to keysigning.

For instance, it could be that David signs any old key without really verifying the key (as described above) - or it could be that David's private key doesn't belong to David at all. In these cases you'd mark David's key as being "untrustworthy" and his signature would carry no weight.

In this way, by **verifying** and signing keys
wherever possible a "web of trust" may be built up. With trusted
keys vouching for new keys. Of course, the weak point is now that
person who signs a key without justification - this is why PGP is
configurable to allow the user to say how much they trust a key's
owner to sign other keys, how many valid signatures are required
for a valid key, etc.

Remember, when someone signs a key they are **not**
saying "I believe that this person is a good and trustworthy soul",
they are simply saying "I have good evidence that this key belongs
to the person whose name is attached to the key".

So if you cannot get any signatures, don't take it as a personal snub, simply supply better evidence as to your identity!